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Everyone agrees on the importance of education, and that each 
child and student deserves the best education they can get. We 
all want to improve standards: but people continue to disagree 
fundamentally about the ways in which this can be done. It has 
also been observed that education seems to be uniquely isolated 
from the huge changes that have swept through almost every 
other sector, including apparently similar ones such as Health. 
Since our establishment in 2011, GEMS Education Solutions has 
sought to examine how education systems can be transformed 
and what roles the public and private sector can play in this 
transformation. Our philosophy for tackling the world’s toughest 
education challenges is a practical one: to find out what can be 
learned, what can adopted, and how this knowledge can benefit 
learners to find success and become more globally competitive. 
Our research publications focus on three main questions: 
Can the outcomes of education and skills systems be 
improved? Can education system processes and school/
college practices be improved? And can education and skills 
funding be increased to make more resources available?
In Creating the 21st Century Workforce, we gathered opinions 
from some of the world’s most influential political, business and 
education leaders, asking them how today’s education and 
skills systems are performing and how they can be improved to 
meet tomorrow’s needs. In our second publication, A Powerful 
Impact: The Importance of Engaging Parents, a group of 
leading experts in parent, family and community engagement 
gave their insights on how to adopt best-practice parent 
engagement initiatives. Our report entitled Social Impact Bonds 
and Education in Latin America examined new mechanisms 
for investing in global education; we wanted to explore fresh 
ways to invest in public education while giving the taxpayer 
value for money and addressing age-old social problems.
Our Efficiency Index opens up the question of resource allocation 
as a key policy decision within an education system’s processes. 
If an education system is inefficient, then some of the funding it 
consumes could be better used to further improve outcomes for 
learners; or some money could be released from the education 
system to be spent elsewhere, without any detriment to learners.
Efficiency is a relative question and so we can only understand it by 
comparing one system with another, internationally. Furthermore, 
changes made in a system today may not affect measurable 
learner outcomes for some years, so we need to explore efficiency 
over time. Fortunately, a research team comprising Professor Peter 
Dolton and Dr Oscar Marcenaro-Gutiérrez had previously looked at 
OECD data relating to educational expenditure and educational 
outcomes and believed that a method could be constructed to 
achieve this. Primary econometric analysis and evaluation was 
conducted by this team, with a further analytical narrative and 
policy perspective created by Adam Still, an Education Finance 
and Development specialist within GEMS Education Solutions. 
Natasha Turner, our senior Marketing and Communications 
Manager, oversaw the production of this publication. 
We are incredibly grateful for the input of our Advisory Board 
made up of Lord Andrew Adonis, Andreas Schleicher and 
Russell Hobby. The final report has been much influenced 
by their expertise, insights and recommendations. 
The report as a whole seeks to provide a lens through which 
to debate what we value about education, and how we can 
improve the allocation of resources in a system to increase 
value for money. In our country-level analysis we also aim 
to raise questions about what individual countries might do 
to improve standards; but we fully acknowledge that in so 
doing we are starting a debate, rather than concluding it.
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DESIRABLE CONSEQUENCE IF EFFICIENCY IS IMPROVED
National education system is inefficient
SITUATION
BY INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
or
The system could achieve  
the same outcomes  
with fewer resources
Financial savings are  
recognised by government
Funds are freed up to be 
reinvested (effectively increasing 
the education system budget)
The system could achieve
greater outcomes 
with the same resources
Pupils achieve greater
educational success at no extra
cost to government
Figure 1. Why Efficiency Matters
Preface 
by Chris Kirk
Chief Executive, GEMS Education Solutions
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Lord Andrew Adonis was Minister 
for Education in the UK Government 
of Tony Blair (2005-2008). 
This GEMS Education System Efficiency Index is invaluable, but 
not necessarily for straightforward reasons. The merit of looking 
at questions of efficiency, I believe, is not simply to find out which 
systems are more efficient than others: rather, it is to use efficiency 
as a lens through which to examine how excellent results can be 
achieved in different environments, and using varying methods. 
The most striking finding of the Index is that the two most efficient 
systems (Finland and Korea) score highly because they combine 
very high standardised PISA scores with only moderately high 
teacher salaries and relatively high pupil/teacher ratios. Their 
‘output’ – in pupil attainment – is exceptionally high relative to 
their main ‘input’ cost, which is what makes them so ‘efficient’. 
Significantly, they are not scoring highly in efficiency terms by 
combining cheap ‘inputs’ with only moderate ‘outputs.’ 
Finland’s teacher salaries, while above the international average, 
are notably much lower than those in richer European nations, such 
as Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In Finland, 
teaching is a highly attractive career but without exceptional salary 
levels. Salaries are somewhat higher in Korea than in Finland, but 
still well below the aforementioned European countries.
The countries ranked third and fourth in the overall index (Czech 
Republic and Hungary) have exceptionally low teacher salaries,  
in common with most of the former Eastern European states.  
This makes them less interesting to policymakers looking for 
models of excellence and reform. 
No school can be better than its teachers, and Finland and Korea 
have exemplary teaching workforces, with intense competition for 
teacher training places. In these countries, however, it is clearly not 
high salaries that draw exceptionally able graduates into teaching. 
There are also important cultural forces at work which boost 
teacher status, as explained in Pasi Sahlberg’s Finnish Lessons: 
what the world can learn from educational change in Finland. 
These forces are partly historical, but are also related to investment 
in teachers. For example, all Finnish teachers have master’s degrees, 
while Korea also has exemplary teacher training and support. I vividly 
recall visiting a primary school in Helsinki and asking the principal 
what the biggest problem she had with her teachers was. “So many 
of the good ones want to go and do doctorates,” she replied, to my 
astonishment: as Minister for Schools in England, no one had ever 
raised this issue with me as a problem in teacher retention! 
Finland and Korea, then, are notably successful. However, 
bracketing them together as exceptionally ‘efficient’ only serves to 
raise another significant lesson from this Index: namely, that there 
are great differences between the two systems in aspects  
not included in this assessment. 
To illustrate: Finland is widely regarded as a model for a self-
regulating ‘comprehensive’ education system, with teachers in 
charge and little intervention by way of national testing until the very 
end of compulsory education. Parents are not encouraged to overly 
‘push’ their children, and certainly not to the detriment of their wider 
social development. There is also considerable emphasis on the arts 
and creativity as part of a broad and balanced education.  
 
Korea, by contrast, is widely regarded as a model for the ultra-
disciplined Asian education system, with constant testing and 
examination, long hours of semi-compulsory study beyond the 
school day, and a strong bias towards mathematics and the 
sciences. Creativity and wider cultural education are less emphasised 
– though national policy is now seeking to enhance their status. 
Again, it is an image from a ministerial visit which sticks in my mind: 
the long queues of pupils at bus stops in Seoul on their way home 
after evening (private) school, and the posters advertising celebrity 
lecturers at these schools. It was the same in Taipei.
It is clear, then, that high-achieving education systems come in 
more than one form: and broadly equivalent ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ 
in terms of spending levels and pupil attainment can generate very 
different methods and cultures of learning.
It is therefore important not to take simple lessons from this GEMS 
index. There is no easy recipe for a ‘good efficient’ system. But a highly 
professional teaching force, which is well but not excessively paid, and 
with pupil/teacher ratios not excessively small, is a good starting point.
Topic Insight
The Challenge
to Innovate
by Andreas Schleicher
Topic Insight
The Policy
Perspective 
by Lord Andrew Adonis
Andreas Schleicher is Director for 
Education and Skills, and Special  
Advisor on Education Policy to the 
Secretary-General at the Organisation  
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in Paris.
Education transforms lives and drives economies. Without the 
right education, people languish on the margins of society; 
technological progress does not translate into economic growth; 
and countries cannot compete in an increasingly knowledge-
based global society. If there is one lesson the global economy 
has taught us over the last few years, it is that we cannot artificially 
bail ourselves out of a crisis simply using quantitative easing 
and related methods. The best course for countries to drive their 
economies forward remains to educate more people in ways that 
lead to better jobs and better lives.
There are some inconvenient truths about education: spending 
explains less than a fifth of the performance differences among 
countries, i.e. two countries with similar spending can produce very 
different educational results. The world is also no longer neatly 
divided into rich, well-educated countries and poor, badly educated 
countries. Most worryingly, education in most countries has not 
improved as it became more expensive: while spending per pupil in 
the industrialised world increased by more than 30% over the last 
decade, learning outcomes in most countries have remained flat. 
To illustrate the present situation in teaching, imagine a teacher 
and a surgeon from the 1940s travelling in time to the year 2014. 
The surgeon, who in the 40s was able to operate with a small set 
of instruments and their existing academic knowledge, would now 
find a world in which surgeons are part of a dynamic profession 
that owns and builds its rapidly advancing professional practice, 
working as part of complex multi-disciplinary teams in a highly 
technological workplace. In contrast, however, most teachers from 
the 1940s would find their workplace and the work organisation  
of schooling largely unchanged today. 
There are plenty of reasons for this lack of development in education. 
One reason is that the most effective spending choices are often 
not the most politically convenient. For example, research has 
shown consistently that high-performing education systems tend 
to prioritise the quality of teachers over the size of classes. And yet, 
much of the additional money the industrialised world has spent on 
education over the last decade has gone into smaller classes. 
This report takes a refreshing look at internationally comparative 
data to examine the spending choices made by those countries that 
are achieving the best results with the least resources. Of course, such 
analyses are never perfect. The pupil learning results that this report 
uses as benchmarks for success are important, but they are not the 
only outcomes educators strive for. The relationship between the 
volume of inputs and their quality also remains uncertain. Similarly, 
the apparent high degree of efficiency of the East Asian education 
systems may, at least in part, be due to significant household 
spending on out-of-school education that is not accounted for by the 
analysis. Finally, the performance differences among the countries 
examined here cover less than a quarter of the variability 
in outcomes that are observed between schools and pupils. 
These caveats should not diminish the importance of this report, 
which breaks the silence on the efficiency of educational services. 
It raises questions about what is possible in improving value for 
money, at a time at which many countries struggle with tight public 
budgets. It also sends an important message to poorer countries 
that significant educational improvement is possible even with 
limited investment in education. Those who consider educational 
services too important to be measured against their efficiency will 
deprive many children of a better education and a better life. Those 
who consider it unfair or inappropriate to compare the efficiency of 
educational services across national and cultural boundaries ignore 
the fact that, in a global economy, the benchmark for educational 
success is no longer improvement by national standards alone, but 
the best-performing school systems internationally.
The world has become indifferent to tradition and past reputations, 
unforgiving of frailty and ignorant of custom. Success will go to 
those educators, institutions and countries which are swift to adapt, 
slow to complain and open to change. The task for governments is 
to help their citizens rise to this challenge.
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In TIMSS, PIRLS and PISA we now have global comparators for the 
educational outcomes produced by participating countries. Coupled 
with the fact that national education budgets represent a significant 
proportion of government spending1, the most pressing question 
is one of efficiency: whose systems are producing the best results 
per dollar? At a time when education systems are under pressure to 
modernise and produce young people with skills for the 21st century, 
the global economy is also under pressure to provide resources 
– efficiency has never been more relevant. The GEMS Education 
Solutions Efficiency Index is the first comprehensive international 
analysis of education system inputs and their relative impact on 
educational outcomes. It looks at how efficiently significant cost-
drivers are allocated in each country, and ranks 30 OECD countries 
based on these inputs and the pupil outcomes achieved.
Education efficiency is not immediately concerned with raising 
PISA scores. To give an analogy: the fuel efficiency of a car is 
important because it tells you how many miles you can travel per 
gallon of fuel. But if you plan to embark on a long journey and 
want to know how to travel further, the answer is still to put more 
fuel in the tank, regardless of your car’s efficiency. The same is 
true of education systems. With unlimited funding available much 
more could be done to increase education outcomes, but this is 
unrealistic: government budgets are limited, and spending needs 
to be prioritised accordingly in order to deliver value for money.
Our methodology shows that teacher salaries and class size are 
the only two contributing factors, out of 63 different components 
studied, that have a demonstrable impact on education outcomes, 
as defined by PISA scores. Improving either or both of these 
has significant cost implications, requiring additional resources. 
However, we find that there is a point beyond which increased 
investment does not guarantee an increased return, thereby 
introducing inefficiency. 
The message is that education system inefficiency can be a result 
of both underpaying and overpaying teachers. To illustrate: if 
teachers are underpaid, it may be harder to recruit high-calibre 
individuals into the profession, or retain them. Learning outcomes 
will suffer - which impacts efficiency. Conversely, if teachers are 
overpaid, they may have fewer incentives to perform well once in 
secure positions; or, in some cases, higher salaries may be given 
to those teachers whom achieve excellence regardless of their 
current level of compensation. In such cases, increased spending 
on teachers’ salaries may not achieve the hoped-for improvements 
in performance, and again efficiency suffers. Similarly, our research 
also suggests that from an efficiency perspective, class sizes can be 
both too big and too small. 
Our calculations find that Finland strikes the most efficient 
balance between teacher salaries and class sizes in order to 
produce educational outcomes.  Using this as our benchmark for 
“maximum” efficiency we are able to calculate how PISA scores 
can be theoretically raised to Finland’s level by adjusting these 
two inputs – both of which are within the power of policymakers. 
This optimisation does not entail a one-size-fits-all approach: 
countries can use a different combination of teacher salary 
level and class size to improve their educational outcomes.
The report acknowledges that efficiency may not be the most 
important factor for some countries. Some countries will choose 
to pursue policies in which improving educational quality, rather 
than education system efficiency, is their most important goal. To 
return to the car analogy: customers buying luxury sports cars are 
not likely to be concerned with fuel efficiency; they can choose to 
prioritise other desirable features and are prepared to pay higher 
fuel costs for the privilege. This is an informed choice: but who 
are the high-end customers in education? Are they aware of the 
premium they are paying? If so, the additional benefits should be 
clearly defined for the taxpayer. If not, improving system efficiency 
should be of great interest.
Regardless of context, the Efficiency Index sheds light on the 
effectiveness of the spending choices that policymakers are 
currently making. As governments seek to improve their education 
systems within financial constraints, we hope to inform debate 
about which items of educational expenditure are likely to make 
the greatest impact on the attainment of children.
1 An average of 5.4% of GDP for OECD countries. 73% of countries lie within +/-1% of this figure.
Executive Summary 
by Adam Still
Education Finance and Development Specialist, GEMS Education Solutions
The Efficiency Index
The Efficiency Index The Efficiency Index
10 The Efficiency Index 11
Finland
Korea
Czech Republic
Hungary
Japan
New Zealand
Slovenia
Australia
Sweden
Iceland
UK
France
Israel
Netherlands
Ireland
Austria
Norway
Belgium
USA
Chile
Turkey
Denmark
Italy
Portugal
Germany
Spain
Greece
Switzerland
Indonesia
Brazil
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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12
13
14
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17
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21
22
23
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27
28
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87.81%
86.66%
84.38%
84.08%
83.88%
83.30%
83.28%
81.23%
80.58%
79.39%
78.71%
78.69%
77.84%
76.80%
76.80%
74.68%
74.05%
73.52%
72.66%
72.54%
71.44%
70.60%
69.81%
68.29%
67.01%
63.09%
60.64%
59.71%
51.13%
25.45%
Efficiency
Scores
5
1
14
24
2
12
10
9
23
17
16
15
25
4
11
8
18
6
22
28
27
13
20
19
7
21
26
3
30
29
PISA rank
(2012 Maths)CountryRanking
Table 1. Efficiency scores (%) by country3
2 Authors’ calculations.
3 Authors’ calculations.
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Each year, trillions of dollars are spent by 
governments on their education systems  
($2.2 trillion total for the 30 countries in  
our study)2 with the objective of educating 
their children to the highest standard 
possible. Some governments use available 
budgets more efficiently than others.
Using econometric methods we examine 
30 OECD countries to ascertain which 
inputs funded by governments really do 
make a difference, and which countries are 
combining these inputs most effectively 
to produce the best educational outcomes 
for each dollar invested. The results are 
based on internationally comparable 
data collected over the last 15 years, 
using standardized PISA scores as the 
measurement of system output.
In summary we find: 
Finland, Korea and 
the Czech Republic 
are the most 
educationally  
efficient countries
In general, 
Mediterranean 
countries exhibit 
quite low efficiency 
(Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy)
Switzerland and 
Germany, whose 
GDP per head is over 
50% higher than the 
Czech Republic, pay 
much higher teacher 
salaries but attain a 
much lower efficiency 
score ranking
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SPAIN
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83,475
SWITZERLAND
19,681
TURKEY
23,396
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28,027
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8,651
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14,977
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There are around 1.3 billion children enrolled in primary and 
secondary schools worldwide4. Education is an enormous global 
operation where cultures and strategies are remarkably different. 
In this research we seek the answer to the following question: 
Given the limited resources available, which governments are 
using these most effectively to produce the best outcomes 
for their young people, as measured by their educational 
attainment? In the process we examine which education 
resources (or system inputs) produce the most valuable return 
on investment – a potentially powerful insight for policymakers 
wishing to increase efficiency and drive their system forward.
This Index is particularly relevant in the context of economic 
recession. In most countries, public expenditure on school 
education represents a significant share of total government 
budget. Furthermore, the global proportion of government spend 
on education has, on average, risen for the past 20 years (see 
Figure 2). The Education sector may therefore find it increasingly 
difficult to compete for funding with other public sectors such as 
Health, Transport and Defence. There is a potential large financial 
saving to be made if we can better understand the underlying 
relationship between resource inputs and pupil performance. As 
the global economy evolves, technology disrupts, and business 
processes improve, the role of the public sector in producing highly-
educated young people who contribute to social development 
and economic competitiveness has never been more important. 
Achieving this without increasing spending is a challenge.
In what follows, we have examined system efficiency from a 
data-driven perspective, using different econometric approaches 
for a set of OECD countries. The Efficiency Index we present 
is a relative measure – Finland has been calculated to be 
operating at the notional maximum, but even that system 
could achieve more with less. For example, each education 
system needs to decide how much funding to invest in 
teaching materials, infrastructure, reducing class sizes or more 
highly-paid teachers. This research examines the influence 
of these measurable inputs over the last 15 years and their 
effect on the desired output, defined to be PISA scores.
Many other studies have examined the relationships and factors 
that influence pupil performance. The effects of a high-performing 
teacher or a child’s socio-economic background are two well-
documented examples5. However, these are micro-level factors 
that are to a large extent beyond the direct control of a country’s 
education ministry. In this study, we concentrate on the macro-level 
inputs, controlled by policymakers and subject to the inevitable 
trade-offs at government level owing to finite spending power.
We ask not which countries are at the  
top of the PISA league table, but rather:
1. Which countries are highest up  
the league table given their 
available resources?
2. Which components of an 
education system (inputs) have 
the most significant impact on 
pupil performance and therefore 
represent the best value for money?
3. Should systems strive for efficiency 
or quality (or both)?
4 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Authors’ calculation.
5 See, for example: Sanders and Rivers, Cumulative and Residual Effects of Teachers on Future Student Academic Achievement (1996) and OECD,    
 Overcoming Social Background (2009).
Figure 37.  Total education spend ($m)
Most recent figures available
Figure 26. %of National GDP spent on Education - World Average
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6 Data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics via World Bank DataBank, Authors’ calculations.
7 Data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics via World Bank DataBank, Authors’ calculations.
Introducing Efficiency
Education systems are huge: they consume vast and increasing quantities of national 
resource, for which there is competition from other sectors.
Efficient returns should be expected from this investment: in this report we study whose 
system is generating the greatest educational return for each dollar invested.
Figure 4. 
Correlation PISA  
scores (Maths) – 
Expenditure per head ($)
Note: We have represented only 
countries for which we have 
information also on the status 
index, tutoring and type of school 
they attended. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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More with Less? The Finnish Frontier
Only teacher salaries and the pupil/teacher ratio are statistically significant: of the 63 
education system inputs captured by the OECD and TIMSS, our analysis finds that only these two  
have a material impact on PISA scores.
Improving both of these has significant cost implications: increasing system inputs results in  
increased outputs, but simply investing more money into the system is not an option available to  
most countries. Governments must try to be as effective as possible with limited resources.
Over the last 15 years Finland’s education system has been the most efficient:   
our calculations show that for every dollar spent on teacher salaries and class sizes,  
Finland’s outcomes are greatest.
We therefore treat Finland’s system as being the theoretical benchmark of maximum efficiency.
We are fortunate in now having very detailed comparative 
performance data across the world which tells us how pupils  
score on PISA and TIMSS attainment tests. 
These league tables have been scrutinised and controversially 
debated for the last 20 years or so. We also have excellent  
data from the OECD which facilitate comparison of each  
country’s educational system. We used these to test each input’s 
statistical impact on PISA scores (a total of 63 input variables –  
see Annex D for a full list). Two of these inputs proved to be 
statistically significant:
1. Teacher wages
2. Pupil/teacher ratio8 
Teacher pay scales have a large and direct impact on government 
budget, typically accounting for more than 80% of education 
budgets9. The ratio of pupils per teacher impacts the same budget 
line (total teacher salaries) by affecting the total number of 
teachers required by the system for a given number of pupils. Both 
these variables can (and can only be) altered by the education 
system policies. They are independent of a child’s socio-economic 
background, demographics, parental involvement, or aspiration level.
Ultimately, the finding above suggests that the more money 
there is available to spend on teachers, the better results will be 
– perhaps not a surprising result. We now take the analysis one 
step further and examine the “optimal” combination of these two 
inputs within the available funding envelope: rather than require 
extra resources, could more be achieved with the same (or less)?
The econometric methodology we have used to construct our 
efficiency index (stochastic frontier production function analysis10) 
treats the educational system as if it were a company which 
attempts to obtain an output (pupil attainment via PISA scores)  
by the transformation of a set of inputs (teacher wages and class 
size) via the educational process. We condition for other features 
of each education system: but our findings indicate that these two 
inputs remain the chief policy lever open to governments aiming  
to materially improve pupil attainment.
This method calculates and fixes a maximum potential 
performance (“frontier”) which becomes the reference point  
against which all other countries are measured. Statistically, 
Finland produces the greatest outcomes for its investment. 
This isn’t to say that the Finnish system is the “right” answer,  
but rather that the Finnish balance of material inputs creates the 
most efficient observable system. In fact, this observation is true 
over the entire period where data is available (see Annex C: “Time 
Invariance of Efficiency”). A new “frontier” will only become a reality 
when a system strikes a different balance of inputs that, dollar for 
dollar, generates higher PISA scores. Given how sensitive education 
systems can be to cultural and national dynamics, creating  
one’s own efficient combination may be a more realistic  
ambition than mimicking Finland’s.
Consequently, our measure of relative efficiency computes the 
distance between a country’s actual input-output combination  
and the frontier. Using such a metric, we can express the shortfall 
of a country’s educational system, or inefficiency, from the 
hypothetical maximum. 
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R² = 0.4769
2 Authors’ calculations
10 See Annex E.
11 For reference only – does not impact efficiency ranking.
8 We will use the phrase “class size” interchangeably.
9 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, accessed via http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/teachers-statistics.aspx
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Combinations are Key
There is not a single magic ingredient to efficient systems: efficiency is driven by  
the appropriate combination of three metrics (2 inputs, 1 output).
The two highest ranking countries in the efficiency index (Finland and Korea) have  
similar characteristics in terms of these metrics: they achieve good results, pay teachers 
reasonable wages and have relatively high pupil/ teacher ratios.
Our efficiency scores are based on cross-country pooled data over 
the last 15 years, using standardized PISA scores as the dependent 
variable. Although Finland has historically achieved high PISA scores, 
this is not necessarily a requirement in efficiency stakes. Neither is 
there a requirement to have very large classes or low teacher salaries 
(both cost savers), but rather efficiency scores indicate the balance of 
all these characteristics. Indeed, Table 2 below shows that Finland 
is not the top performer in any of the determining categories.
Clearly there is a set of countries with high relative educational 
efficiency. Finland, the Czech Republic and Hungary all score highly, 
while Korea and Japan also do well. In contrast, Mediterranean 
countries exhibit, in general, quite low efficiency (Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy). It is worth noting that the UK is only at around 
the 30th percentile in our ranking. More striking is the fact that 
the US, which pays very high average teacher salaries and whose 
overall education spend is more than 5 times any other country in 
our study, is two-thirds of the way down the table. Interestingly, 
wealthy countries like Switzerland and Germany with a GDP per 
head over 50% higher than the Czech Republic, with much higher 
teachers’ wages, attain a much lower efficiency score ranking.
The rankings highlight that countries do not necessarily have to 
pay high teacher wages to efficiently produce outcomes. The Czech 
Republic and Hungary are two good examples of this; they adopt 
more “favourable” pupil/teacher ratios instead. The key is in the 
different combination of inputs.
Interestingly, Finland and Korea are remarkably similarly from 
a data perspective. They both achieve highly on PISA tests; by 
international comparison pay teachers moderate wages; and 
have relatively high pupil/teacher ratios. These two countries top 
the efficiency ranking despite very different cultural dynamics and 
approaches to education. This suggests that although efficient 
systems will exhibit similar macro-level characteristics, there is no 
right or wrong way to hit some key indicators: the approach has 
to be appropriate for the environment, although the fundamental 
combination of inputs is similar.
Pupil/teacher ratio
Teacher wages
after 15 years
($1,000 PPP corrected)
Efficiency Index (%) 
and Rank
Low PISA scores
Low pupil/teacher ratio
High teacher salaries
High PISA scores
High pupil/teacher ratio
Low teacher salaries
Table 2.
Most recent available data 
(N.B. Average data is used 
in following sections)
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Figure 6. Percentage change required in teacher 
salary to increase PISA score to the level of 
Finland (holding class size constant)
Note: The extreme figure for Indonesia is not drawn to facilitate 
the graphical comparison of countries.
Source: Table 3
Table 3.
We have chosen to compare teachers’ PPP (Purchasing Power Parity)12  
adjusted salaries, rather than a relative measure (e.g. by comparison to 
average national salaries ). We do so because many assumptions are 
required to be able to use such relative measures, which thereby renders 
practical interpretations unclear. The availability of reliable data to make 
these assumptions is also questionable in the case of many countries. For the 
purposes of generating our efficiency index, we believe PPP-corrected values 
from the OECD provide a more accurate and fair international comparator.
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United Kingdom
United States
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Finland
France
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Israel
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Hungary
Turkey
Brazil
Chile
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Current 
salary
($ PPP)
68,820
51,470
53,730
57,870
41,520
45,930
44,000
47,300
41,710
47,340
37,410
34,590
40,910
41,460
33,130
42,810
33,570
34,760
31,460
29,480
32,480
25,750
31,610
19,550
18,610
14,760
17,180
14,840
16,410
2,830
Target 
salary
($ PPP)
35,470
33,500
37,660
41,010
32,880
37,460
35,990
38,870
35,800
40,870
32,910
30,840
36,920
39,520
31,860
n/a
34,000
36,660
34,760
34,170
38,210
30,310
37,560
34,460
33,990
33,710
39,380
41,610
53,340
12,610
% increase
to achieve 
target
-48.5
-34.9
-29.9
-29.1
-20.8
-18.4
-18.2
-17.8
-14.2
-13.7
-12.0
-10.8
-9.8
-4.7
-3.8
n/a
1.3
5.5
10.5
15.9
17.6
17.7
18.8
76.3
82.6
128.4
129.2
180.4
225.0
345.6
Teachers’ Salaries
A Point of Policy?
12 Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) are the rates of currency conversion that eliminate the differences in price levels between countries.
Assuming class sizes can be held constant, all countries could improve their educational 
outcomes to Finland’s level by either increasing or decreasing teachers’ salaries.
Inefficiency can be a result of either overpaying teachers (Switzerland and Belgium top the 
table) or underpaying teachers (Indonesia and Chile foot the table). These countries occupy 4 
of the bottom 6 spots in the overall efficiency rankings.
So far we have described what relationships there might be between 
underlying measured educational variables of interest in our attempt 
to understand education efficiency. In this section we turn our 
attention to potential implications of our analysis. Namely, if we wish 
to change the efficiency of an educational system, how extreme would 
those changes have to be? We first consider how much we would have 
to change teacher salaries by to bring each country’s PISA score up 
to the level of Finland (keeping class size constant). In the following 
section we look at making increases or decreases to class size, before 
finally exploring the prioritisation of these two policy choices.
Since Finland has proved to be at the frontier of efficiency, we fix 
Finland as our country of reference, assuming it operates at maximum 
efficiency, and so no variation in teacher salaries or pupil/teacher ratio 
is required. This is common practice, as many education ministers de 
facto make just such a comparison. In general, the analysis shows that 
in most developing countries a significant increase in teachers’ wages 
would improve the relative performance of their education systems.
The top and bottom extremes of the table highlight an important 
point: inefficiency can be a result of either overpaying teachers 
(Switzerland and Belgium top the table) or underpaying teachers 
(Indonesia and Chile foot the table). These countries occupy 4 of the 
bottom 6 places in the overall efficiency rankings. This table can be 
used to diagnose where policy decisions on wages have potentially 
introduced system inefficiency in terms of producing high PISA scores.
A useful concept to introduce in relation to this point is peak 
efficiency. In a project to improve outcomes by increasing investment 
in a given education system, there will often be a point past 
which there is a weak rate of outcome-return on investment. (This 
investment may be in the form of teachers’ salaries or increased 
teacher numbers.) The point of peak efficiency is the point past which 
a significant improvement in outcomes requires a very large increase 
in investment, relative to that delivered at lower levels of investment. 
Peak efficiency may be useful for policymakers to consider: if known, 
it can provide countries that have low levels of education investment 
with reason to increase this (up to peak efficiency); conversely, 
countries with high levels of investment and good educational 
outcomes may be able to carry out austerity programmes 
productively if they know that educational outcomes will not be 
significantly reduced by focused curtailment of investment.
If Switzerland, for example, were to decrease its teachers’ salaries 
by 48.5%, while maintaining the pupil/teacher ratio, it could sit 
alongside Finland near the top of the PISA rankings. This would 
of course have practical implications (e.g. decreasing the required 
education budget in this case). The challenge for policymakers 
whose systems occupy the top of the table and wish to drive up 
efficiency would be to balance the following considerations:
• To what extent will reducing wages impact on the quality of 
teaching staff? Is there a need to introduce or scale up recruitment 
strategies that can attract equally high performing teachers at a 
lower cost (e.g. Teach for America, Teach First etc.)?
• Conversely, is the wage set at the right level but teachers are not, 
by international comparison, producing the same level of pupil 
performance? In which case, teacher capacity, curricula and 
pedagogy may be the weak points in the system. i.e. the system 
should be producing more with the plentiful resources expended.
• What are we expecting from teachers? We have used PISA scores as 
the desired output variable in this study. If a system strives for other 
outcomes and therefore has different and more costly requirements 
of its teachers, then the extra spend may represent good value for 
money to that particular country. In that case, policymakers should 
be aware of, and have a well-defined specification of, what this 
premium on salaries buys them. If not, the system is potentially 
unnecessarily inefficient, and the points above merit exploration.
Figure 6 also shows that around half the countries studied would 
need to increase salaries to raise pupil attainment. The analysis does 
therefore suggest that these countries could, on average, potentially 
improve their PISA scores by spending more on recruiting higher-
quality teachers. Indeed, the majority of countries in this bracket do 
find themselves at the lower end of the PISA rankings. Considerations 
are likely to be:
• What recruitment structure should be implemented to ensure that 
higher salaries do actually attract the right individuals rather than simply 
paying more for the same? Is salary the overriding factor in attracting 
highly skilled candidates? Or do other, perhaps cultural, barriers exist?
• Potentially, the system is successfully implementing high-quality 
curricula, teacher training programmes etc. so by comparison, teachers 
may be over-performing (although judging by PISA scores, this is not the 
case with those countries at the extreme). In this case, the sustainability 
of such a policy may be of concern (potentially to the Czech Republic).
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Figure 7. Percentage change in Pupil/Teacher 
Ratio required to increase PISA score to the level 
of Finland (holding teacher wage constant)
Source: Table 4
Table 4.
PISA scores could also be improved by varying the ratio of pupils to teachers.
The two most efficient systems (Finland and Korea) have the 3rd and 5th largest  
pupil/teacher ratios (implies greater class sizes).
We now look at the other significant input variable and estimate 
how much each country would have to vary its pupil/teacher ratio 
in order to achieve Finland’s PISA scores.
Class sizes are both a policy decision and a resource constraint.  
For a given number of pupils, the class size dictates how many 
teachers you need in the system and therefore what budget is 
required. It is worth reiterating that we are using the terms “class 
size” and “pupil/teacher ratio” interchangeably, when in fact 
there is a subtle difference13. It is also within leaders’ power to 
vary class sizes without affecting the overall pupil/teacher ratio, 
most significantly via teaching contact time. The quantity of 
teachers required to teach pupil cohorts of a defined size will also 
impacted by the education model employed and the proportion 
of part-time staff.
Class size as it relates to quality of outcomes is well-debated in the 
existing literature.  Here we present the theoretical targets to raise 
PISA scores, given each country’s existing wage structure.
It is worth stressing that our research is not suggesting an ideal 
target figure for either teachers’ salaries or pupil/teacher ratios.
It is the combination of both these inputs and the resulting 
PISA score which drive efficiency. Our results are therefore 
contextual for each country. To produce Finland’s attainment, 
there is an ideal combination of teacher salaries and pupil/
teacher ratio – we have fixed each one of these in turn and 
calculated the required variation in the other. This variation 
would not be without cost implications. (As previously discussed, 
raw cost per pupil does not feature in our efficiency calculation.)
Take the example of Chile, who 
theoretically would need to reduce their 
pupil/teacher ratio to 1.97 – a drastic (and 
practically impossible) change. Chile has 
the 2nd highest class size as well as the 
4th lowest teacher salaries. One would 
perhaps expect such input metrics to be 
good for efficiency, but resulting outcomes 
are so low as to create inefficiency 
(Chile ranks 20th on the efficiency index). 
Because both Chile’s input variables lie 
at the extremes of the spectrum, holding 
one constant therefore requires a drastic 
change in the other to counteract it. In 
practice, improving efficiency for Chile 
would require changing both inputs to 
move the system closer to the “maximum” 
balance – the research suggests improved 
PISA scores will follow.
Class Sizes
A Point of Policy?
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Indonesia
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Czech Republic
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Sweden
Slovenia
Italy
New Zealand
France
Finland
United States
Norway
United Kingdom
Korea
Austria
Denmark
Portugal
Ireland
Australia
Japan
Spain
Netherlands
Switzerland
Germany
Belgium
27.6
17.4
16.4
12.3
11.7
32.1
12.0
9.7
10.9
14.4
14.1
10.8
13.5
10.4
16.5
15.3
9.2
13.4
18.2
10.2
12.7
7.6
14.8
12.6
13.1
10.1
16.4
11.6
13.7
9.9
2.0
1.3
1.4
1.0
1.2
5.3
3.2
6.1
7.1
9.6
9.5
8.2
12.0
10.1
n/a
16.8
10.2
16.6
23.3
13.8
17.4
10.6
21.6
19.0
19.8
17.0
29.9
22.3
26.5
19.3
Actual
pupil/ 
teacher
ratio
Target
pupil/ 
teacher
ratio
%
change
to achieve 
target
-92.9
-92.7
-91.6
-91.5
-89.8
-83.5
-73.8
-37.6
-34.5
-33.1
-32.6
-24.4
-11.2
-3.4
n/a
10.1
11.1
23.8
28.5
35.6
37.2
39.6
45.5
50.8
51.9
68.3
82.4
92.1
94.0
94.4
Chile
Indonesia
Turkey
Czech Republic
Israel
Brazil
Hungary
Greece
Iceland
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Slovenia
Italy
New Zealand
France
Finland
United States
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United Kingdom
Korea
Austria
Denmark
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Australia
Japan
Spain
Netherlands
Switzerland
Germany
Belgium
13 The reader is cautioned that the most commonly used measures – class size and Pupil/Teacher ratios - need to be treated with care as a high values
 of these ‘inputs’ mean obviously poorer resource levels for pupils and we would like to see lower levels of this inputs.
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Table 5.
Inefficiency is caused by sub-optimal teacher salaries, or class sizes,  
or a combination of both.
The extent to which varying either of these will have an impact is specific 
to each country. Differing cultures, public opinion and political influences 
will impact on the practicality of implementing reforms.
Salaries and class sizes are typically chosen by education authorities 
based on administrative conventions and political directives from 
government. Changing them is an explicit option open to decision 
makers. The previous two sections demonstrate the relative power of a 
particular country varying one or other input. For example, we observe 
from our model that by international comparison, the UK could 
theoretically achieve Finland’s PISA scores with a 23.8% larger pupil/
teacher ratio, or alternatively, just a 9.8% decrease in teacher salaries. 
In contrast to this, the total educational spending envelope will likely 
be beyond education authorities’ control. It will be predetermined by 
the aggregate level of economic growth and the fraction of a country’s 
GDP that is devoted to educational expenditure. 
Politicians must work within the framework of the resources given 
to them to balance a policy’s effectiveness with the practicalities 
of implementation. Put another way: politicians must aim to 
implement the most efficient and feasible policy for their country.
Our efficiency index is a product of three variables (2 inputs  
and 1 output). Changing one variable will have an effect 
specifically relevant in the context of the other two. Thus an 
appropriate strategy to drive efficiency in one system may  
have the opposite effect on another.
By looking at relative changes required in salaries and class size, 
we group countries according to implied policy priorities to raise 
educational outcomes, defined by:
1 Address class size
Although these systems could drive efficiency 
by lowering teacher salaries, little impact will be 
noticed unless drastic measures are taken, which is 
extremely unlikely in reality. However, all of these 
systems have smaller class sizes than Finland and 
Korea, suggesting this could be an appropriate 
strategy to drive efficiency and quality.
2 Address teacher salaries
Change in class size required would be impractically 
drastic. Systems should review teachers’ salaries 
to drive efficiency and quality improvements.
3 Changing both class sizes 
and salaries could be effective
Relatively small changes in teacher salaries 
could produce Finland’s PISA scores. Overnight 
reductions are unlikely to be suggested, whereas 
pay freezes are not unknown. Adjusting pupil/
teacher ratios to is also an available option.
Policy Priorities
“This sort of approach to 
education – comparative, 
analytical, quantifiable – 
should be welcomed for 
the way it challenges us.” 
Russell Hobby,
General Secretary of the National Association
of Head Teachers.
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34.59
32.48
41.52
31.61
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41.46
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Average
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35.99
32.91
33.5
41.61
53.34
33.99
35.8
34
37.66
30.31
33.71
34.17
12.61
38.87
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37.46
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41.01
36.66
31.86
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38.21
32.88
37.56
35.47
39.38
36.92
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Target 
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Salary
CountryGroup
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
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1
2
2
2
2
1
2
3
1
1
1
3
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
3
3
12.61
10.15
9.94
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27.56
12.27
12.71
10.43
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9.73
12.01
10.88
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14.83
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16.38
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13.76
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5.29
1.97
1.04
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1.2
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17.02
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1.38
16.59
16.84
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Both
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Both
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Both
Both
Priority
pupil/teacher 
ratio or salaries
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Efficiency vs Quality
In general, countries demonstrating high efficiency also attain high education outcomes.
Efficiency is a very important metric to consider – some countries may wish to prioritise  
efficiency over quality. For others, the opposite is true. Country context will dictate this.
Having computed our efficiency scores it is important to consider 
the emphasis policy makers should place on them, given the highly 
context-specific nature of education systems. Salient questions are: 
to what extent is there a relationship between efficiency scores and 
quality (PISA scores)? To what extent can variation in attainment be 
explained by educational system efficiency? Should countries strive 
for efficiency or absolute quality at any cost? Clearly a country’s 
economic status will influence the freedom available in making this 
choice, but how should available resources be prioritised?
Hungary and Switzerland are good 
examples of this trade-off:
• Hungary scores very well on the
efficiency index, but poorly when 
it comes to producing results.
• Switzerland is the opposite – its PISA 
scores are among the best, but at huge 
cost, resulting in a poor efficiency ranking.
These are two extremes, but the consideration exists for all 
countries: some are in the fortunate position to be able to focus 
on outcomes, because resources are plentiful. Customers buying 
luxury sports cars are not likely to be concerned with fuel efficiency; 
they can choose to prioritise other desirable features and are 
prepared to pay higher fuel costs for the privilege. It is very possible 
that some education systems are similarly paying a premium for 
additional outcomes beyond PISA scores. Although providing an 
excellent method of comparing educational attainment across 
borders, they cannot measure every output of the system. In such 
cases, inefficiency may not be considered a problem, but these 
additional outcomes must be known and desired. If they are 
unknown, inefficiency should be explored. Most countries have to 
squeeze as much as possible out of what little they have and not 
endanger financial stability, perhaps at the cost of putting a ceiling 
on outcomes. Regardless, all countries would obviously like to 
achieve more with what they currently have.
From the simple linear regression overleaf (Figure 8b) we can infer 
that 44% of the variation in the PISA score can be explained 
by the variation in the efficiency index scores across countries. 
This suggests that a significant fraction of the heterogeneity 
of educational systems can be explained by the way in which 
each country combines teacher quality and class size to achieve 
its educational goals. Other factors are obviously influential (61 
for which we tested – see Annex D3), but none are statistically 
significant in the way that teacher salaries and the pupil/teacher 
ratio are. In addition, there are other factors for which no metrics 
exist. Context should always be considered when making statistical 
comparisons internationally; cultural differences can result in 
significantly different levels of support in addition to formal 
schooling. For example, the quantity of tutoring received out of 
school time is not considered as a system input, but will contribute 
to the output (pupil attainment via PISA scores). We explore 
private tutoring in Annex B.
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Figure 8a. Group definitions for Correlation between Efficiency and Quality
The ambition of every system is to move as far into the top right quadrant as possible, i.e. high efficiency and high outcomes. For some this will mean prioritising 
quality over efficiency. For others the reverse will be true. The following groupings are defined according to this balance, implied by position on the graph.
GROUP 1
Elite Performers
There is always room for improvement despite the fact that these countries score well in both the efficiency  
and quality stakes.
1 Finland  |  2 Japan  |  3 Korea
GROUP 3
More Effective than Efficient : Overspending or bloated
These countries perform better in quality measures than in terms of efficiency. This may be because they can prioritise 
outcomes over cost, it may be because their system generates other outcomes that aren’t captured by PISA rankings. 
Or more simply, it may be because the system is over-resourced beyond a threshold required to drive quality increases.
4 Austria  |  5 Belgium  |  6 Denmark  |  7 Germany  |  8 Ireland  |  9 Italy
10 Netherlands  |  11 Portugal  |  12 Spain  |  13 Switzerland
GROUP 5
Inefficient and Ineffective
These systems are inefficient and at the same time do not produce comparatively good outcomes. The ultimate 
ambition is to occupy a space in the upper-right quadrant, but progression either horizontally or vertically (increasing 
quality or efficiency) in the first instance could be the catalyst to drive improvements in both dimensions.
26 Brazil  |  27 Chile  |  28 Greece  |  29 Indonesia  |  30 Turkey
GROUP 2
Efficient and Effective
These countries are doing relatively well on both efficiency and producing high PISA scores. They are not in  
the Elite benchmark countries but they are close.
14 Australia  |  15 Czech Republic  |  20 New Zealand  |  22 Slovenia
GROUP 4
More Efficient than Effective: Underspending or underperforming
These countries, by comparison, are more efficient than educationally effective. This could be for the simple reason 
that they have constraints which prevent their system from moving to the next level (e.g. low salaries may prevent 
the teaching profession from being able to recruit highly skilled individuals). More interestingly, if extensive resources 
are already being deployed, it could be the case that underlying flaws exist in the education delivery model – the 
system has the potential to increase outputs for no additional inputs by making policy changes.
16 France  |  17 Hungary  |  18 Iceland  |  19 Israel  |  21 Norway  |  23 Sweden  |  24 UK   |  25 USA
See next page for Figure 8b. Correlation between Efficiency and Quality.
Figure 8b. Correlation between Efficiency and Quality
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Historically, education systems were compared by levels of input before comparators  
such as PISA, TIMMS, PIRLS shifted the focus to outputs.
Correlations have been explored between these inputs and outputs, but there is still much 
progress to be made in being able to explain the practical strategies and policies which can be 
implemented to vary inputs and increase outputs. The Efficiency Index aims to fuel this debate.
In PISA, TIMMS and PIRLS we now have well established 
international benchmarks for education outcomes. We 
also have an increasing quantity of high-quality data on 
numerous other aspects of education delivery: from literacy 
rates to teacher compensation to funding arrangements, 
the list of available metrics is lengthy. We are in an era in 
which education studies and research can move beyond 
simple rankings of single indicators. Much good work has 
been done to identify correlations between education 
system inputs and outputs. Fundamentally, however, 
data and analysis must demonstrate how fit for purpose 
education systems are – whatever that purpose may 
be – before seeking to explain how this is achieved. 
Our analysis only examined OECD countries, but the message 
is potentially even more relevant to young and less well-
developed systems. It shows that the top systems in the 
world, although adopting different methods, are actually very 
similar in a few key policy areas. It also shows that finding 
ways to generate greater inputs may not be the system’s 
most urgent need: more can be done with less. The issue is 
not always what tools you have, but how you use them.
The Efficiency Index challenges policymakers to think 
differently. What if the motor industry had just accepted 
that petrol engines were the only option? What if engineers 
accepted engines as being black boxes, tinkering around the 
edges but making no significant modifications? The hybrid 
car would never have been developed. Rather, the industry 
modernises in search of efficiency; alternative power sources 
are designed to address the problem. Accepting and identifying 
drivers of inefficiency has to be the first stage in the process.
Education systems are complex. International comparisons 
will never be perfect: cultural, political, and socio-economic 
factors all contribute to varying degrees in each country. 
We have focused on one output, but the choice of this 
output in each context is an important part of the debate. 
Data can help, but sophisticated indicators are needed. 
The more light we can shed on the policies and strategies 
that are within our power to change, the more effectively 
education systems can play their role in the society of the 
future. If we are to demand modernisation and reform of 
education systems, the way in which they are measured 
must also reflect this; the Efficiency Index is just the start.
Conclusion
Country profiles
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Sources:
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OECD, Education at a Glance  
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Key country indicators:  
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unless otherwise stated)
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34 Belgium
35 Brazil
36 Chile
37 Czech Republic
38 Denmark
39 Finland
40 France
41 Germany
42 Greece
43 Hungary
44 Iceland
45 Indonesia
46 Ireland
47 Israel
48 Italy
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50 Korea
51 Netherlands
52 New Zealand
53 Norway
54 Portugal
55 Slovenia
56 Spain
57 Sweden
58 Switzerland
59 Turkey
60 UK
61 USA
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Australia ranks in the Top Ten of the Efficiency Index at 81.23% -- just slightly below its neighbour, New Zealand
Our findings suggest that Australia should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Australia’s education system is a good performer, although it appears to be slightly more efficient than effective
8th
Efficiency Index
81.23%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
23.13m $43,550 5.59%
Key Country Indicators
AUSTRALIA
$ $
19.0
Target pupil/teacher ratio
50.8%
Change to achieve target
12.6
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
512
PISA Reading 2012
521
PISA Science 2012
504
PISA Maths 2012
$35,990
Target salary
-18.2%
Change to achieve target
$44,000
Actual salary
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Austria ranks in the middle of the Efficiency Index at 74.68% -- a score that is notably more efficient than its neighbour, 
Germany, but also in keeping with some other Western and Northern European countries’ scores, 
such as those for Belgium, Norway, Ireland and The Netherlands
Our findings suggest that Austria should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Austria’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
Efficiency Index
74.68%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
8.47m $44,168 5.91%
Key Country Indicators
16th
AUSTRIA
$ $
13.8
Target pupil/teacher ratio
35.6%
Change to achieve target
10.2
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
490
PISA Reading 2012
506
PISA Science 2012
506
PISA Maths 2012
$32,910
Target salary
-12.0%
Change to achieve target
$37,410
Actual salary
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Belgium’s Efficiency Index score of 73.52% is close to the bottom third of the Index, 
and sits midway between the rankings of bordering countries, France, The Netherlands and Germany
Our findings suggest that Belgium should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Belgium’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
18th
Efficiency Index
73.52%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
11.20m $40,338 6.58%
Key Country Indicators
BELGIUM
$ $
19.3
Target pupil/teacher ratio
94.4%
Change to achieve target
9.9
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
509
PISA Reading 2012
505
PISA Science 2012
515
PISA Maths 2012
$33,500
Target salary
-34.9%
Change to achieve target
$51,470
Actual salary
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Brazil ranks at the very bottom of the Efficiency Index, with a score of 25.45%, significantly below other countries in the Index
Our findings suggest that Brazil should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Brazil’s education system is both inefficient and ineffective. Higher efficiency correlates with higher educational outcomes
Efficiency Index
25.45%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
200.36m $15,034 5.82%
Key Country Indicators
30th
BRAZIL
$ $
5.3
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-83.5%
Change to achieve target
32.1
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
410
PISA Reading 2012
405
PISA Science 2012
391
PISA Maths 2012
$41,610
Target salary
180.4%
Change to achieve target
$14,840
Actual salary
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Chile sits just inside the bottom third of the Efficiency Index with a score of 72.54%, 
which is a significantly higher ranking than its South American neighbour, Brazil
Our findings suggest that Chile should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Chile’s education system is both inefficient and ineffective. Higher efficiency correlates with higher educational outcomes
20th
Efficiency Index
72.54%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
17.62m $21,911 4.18%
Key Country Indicators
CHILE
$ $
2.0
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-92.9%
Change to achieve target
27.6
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
441
PISA Reading 2012
445
PISA Science 2012
423
PISA Maths 2012
$53,340
Target salary
225.0%
Change to achieve target
$16,410
Actual salary
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The Czech Republic ranks in the top 3 of the Efficiency Index with a laudable score of 84.38%, 
significantly higher than neighbouring countries Germany and Austria
Our findings suggest that Czech Republic should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
The Czech Republic’s education system is a good performer, although it appears to be slightly more efficient than effective
Efficiency Index
84.38%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
10.52m $27,344 4.25%
Key Country Indicators
3rd
CZECH REPUBLIC 
$ $
1.0
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-91.5%
Change to achieve target
12.3
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
493
PISA Reading 2012
508
PISA Science 2012
499
PISA Maths 2012
$33,990
Target salary
82.6%
Change to achieve target
$18,610
Actual salary
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Denmark ranks in the bottom third of the Efficiency Index, at 70.60%,  
below its Scandinavian neighbours Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland
Our findings suggest that Denmark should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Denmark’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
22nd
Efficiency Index
70.60%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
* 2009
5.61m $42,790 8.74%*
Key Country Indicators
DENMARK
$ $
17.4
Target pupil/teacher ratio
37.2%
Change to achieve target
12.7
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
496
PISA Reading 2012
498
PISA Science 2012
500
PISA Maths 2012
$35,800
Target salary
-14.2%
Change to achieve target
$41,710
Actual salary
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Finland has earned the top Efficiency Index ranking, with a score of 87.81%
Our analysis finds that Finland’s education system is the most efficient amongst OECD countries
Finland is a high performer in both the efficiency and quality stakes
Efficiency Index
87.81%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
5.44m $38,251 6.85%
Key Country Indicators
1st
FINLAND
$ $
n/a
Target pupil/teacher ratio
n/a
Change to achieve target
16.5
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
524
PISA Reading 2012
545
PISA Science 2012
519
PISA Maths 2012
n/a
Target salary
n/a
Change to achieve target
$42,810
Actual salary
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France ranks in the top half of the Efficiency Index, and second amongst other Western European countries profiled
Our findings suggest that France should consider addressing both class sizes and teacher salaries to target education efficiency
France’s education system appears to be more efficient than effective. It may be underspending or underperforming
12th
Efficiency Index
78.69%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
66.03m $36,907 5.86%
Key Country Indicators
FRANCE
$ $
10.1
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-3.4%
Change to achieve target
10.4
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
505
PISA Reading 2012
499
PISA Science 2012
495
PISA Maths 2012
$34,000
Target salary
1.3%
Change to achieve target
$33,570
Actual salary
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Germany ranks close to the bottom of the Efficiency Index. Of the six bordering countries, 
that feature on the Index, only Switzerland is ranked lower
Our findings suggest that Germany should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Germany’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
Efficiency Index
67.01%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
80.62m $43,332 5.08%
Key Country Indicators
25th
GERMANY
$ $
26.5
Target pupil/teacher ratio
94.0%
Change to achieve target
13.7
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
508
PISA Reading 2012
524
PISA Science 2012
514
PISA Maths 2012
$37,660
Target salary
-29.9%
Change to achieve target
$53,730
Actual salary
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Greece ranks at the bottom 5 of the Efficiency Index, and below the other Southern European countries profiled
Our findings suggest that Greece should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Greece’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
27th
Efficiency Index
60.64%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
11.03m $25,651 4.09%*
Key Country Indicators
GREECE
$ $
6.1
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-37.6%
Change to achieve target
9.7
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
477
PISA Reading 2012
467
PISA Science 2012
453
PISA Maths 2012
$30,310
Target salary
17.7%
Change to achieve target
$25,750
Actual salary
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Hungary ranked very high on the Efficiency Index, and in between other Eastern European countries,  
Slovenia and the Czech Republic
Our findings suggest that Hungary should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Hungary’s education system appears to be more efficient than effective. It may be underspending or underperforming
Efficiency Index
84.08%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
9.90m $22,190* 4.90%
Key Country Indicators
4th
HUNGARY
$ $
3.2
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-73.8%
Change to achieve target
12.0
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
488
PISA Reading 2012
494
PISA Science 2012
477
PISA Maths 2012
$33,710
Target salary
128.4%
Change to achieve target
$14,760
Actual salary
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Iceland ranks just within the Top 10 behind Sweden and Finland but above Norway and Denmark
Our findings suggest that Iceland should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Iceland’s education system appears to be more efficient than effective. It may be underspending or underperforming
10th
Efficiency Index
79.39%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
0.32m $39,996 7.60%
Key Country Indicators
ICELAND
$ $
7.1
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-34.5%
Change to achieve target
10.9
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
483
PISA Reading 2012
478
PISA Science 2012
493
PISA Maths 2012
$34,170
Target salary
15.9%
Change to achieve target
$29,480
Actual salary
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Indonesia holds the second-bottom ranking on the Efficiency Index, ahead of only Brazil
Our findings suggest that Indonesia should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Indonesia’s education system is both inefficient and ineffective. Higher efficiency correlates with higher educational outcomes
Efficiency Index
51.13%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
249.87m $9,559 2.99%
Key Country Indicators
29th
INDONESIA
$ $
1.3
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-92.7%
Change to achieve target
17.4
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
396
PISA Reading 2012
382
PISA Science 2012
375
PISA Maths 2012
$12,610
Target salary
345.6%
Change to achieve target
$2,830
Actual salary
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Ireland ranks right in the middle of the Efficiency Index, at 76.80%
Our findings suggest that Ireland should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Ireland’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
15th
Efficiency Index
76.80%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
4.60m $43,304 6.41%
Key Country Indicators
IRELAND
$ $
21.6
Target pupil/teacher ratio
45.5%
Change to achieve target
14.8
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
523
PISA Reading 2012
522
PISA Science 2012
501
PISA Maths 2012
$38,870
Target salary
-17.8%
Change to achieve target
$47,300
Actual salary
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Israel is the only Middle Eastern country that has been profiled in the Efficiency Index, and ranks just above the median
Our findings suggest that Israel should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Israel’s education system appears to be more efficient than effective. It may be underspending or underperforming
Efficiency Index
51.13%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
8.06m $32,760 5.59%
Key Country Indicators
13th
ISRAEL
$ $
1.2
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-89.8%
Change to achieve target
11.7
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
486
PISA Reading 2012
470
PISA Science 2012
466
PISA Maths 2012
$34,460
Target salary
76.3%
Change to achieve target
$19,550
Actual salary
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Italy ranks rather low on the Efficiency Index, and between other Southern European countries, Turkey and Greece
Our findings suggest that Italy should consider addressing both class sizes and teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Italy’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
23rd
Efficiency Index
69.81%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
59.83m $34,303 4.50%
Key Country Indicators
ITALY
$ $
8.2
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-24.4%
Change to achieve target
10.8
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
490
PISA Reading 2012
494
PISA Science 2012
485
PISA Maths 2012
$34,760
Target salary
10.5%
Change to achieve target
$31,460
Actual salary
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Japan ranks among the Top 5 of the Efficiency Index, yet still ranks lower than Korea, the only other Asian country profiled
Our findings suggest that Japan should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Japan is a high performer in both the efficiency and quality stakes
Efficiency Index
83.88%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
127.34m $36,315 3.78%
Key Country Indicators
5th
JAPAN
$ $
19.8
Target pupil/teacher ratio
51.9%
Change to achieve target
13.1
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
538
PISA Reading 2012
547
PISA Science 2012
536
PISA Maths 2012
$37,460
Target salary
-18.4%
Change to achieve target
$45,930
Actual salary
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Korea ranks second on the Efficiency Index, with a score of 86.66%
Our findings suggest that Korea should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Korea is a high performer in both the efficiency and quality stakes
2nd
Efficiency Index
86.66%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
50.22m $33,140 5.25%*
Key Country Indicators
KOREA
$ $
23.3
Target pupil/teacher ratio
28.5%
Change to achieve target
18.2
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
536
PISA Reading 2012
538
PISA Science 2012
554
PISA Maths 2012
$40,870
Target salary
-13.7%
Change to achieve target
$47,340
Actual salary
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The Netherlands ranked in the middle of the Efficiency Index, and higher than its bordering countries, Germany and Belgium
Our findings suggest that Netherlands should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
The Netherlands’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
Efficiency Index
76.80%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
16.80m $43,404 5.98%
Key Country Indicators
14th
NETHERLANDS
$ $
29.9
Target pupil/teacher ratio
82.4%
Change to achieve target
16.4
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
511
PISA Reading 2012
522
PISA Science 2012
523
PISA Maths 2012
$41,010
Target salary
-29.1%
Change to achieve target
$57,870
Actual salary
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New Zealand ranks highly on the Efficiency Index, and slightly above its neighbour, Australia
Our findings suggest that New Zealand should consider addressing both class sizes and teacher salaries to target education efficiency
New Zealand’s education system is a good performer, although it appears to be slightly more efficient than effective
6th
Efficiency Index
83.30%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
4.47m $34,227 7.17%
Key Country Indicators
NEW ZEALAND
$ $
12.0
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-11.2%
Change to achieve target
13.5
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
512
PISA Reading 2012
516
PISA Science 2012
500
PISA Maths 2012
$36,660
Target salary
5.5%
Change to achieve target
$34,760
Actual salary
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Norway places in the bottom half of the Efficiency Index, and lower than all other Northern European countries except Denmark
Our findings suggest that Norway should consider addressing both class sizes and teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Norway’s education system appears to be more efficient than effective. It may be underspending or underperforming
Efficiency Index
74.05%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
5.08m $65,461 6.87%
Key Country Indicators
17th
NORWAY
$ $
10.2
Target pupil/teacher ratio
11.1%
Change to achieve target
9.2
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
504
PISA Reading 2012
495
PISA Science 2012
489
PISA Maths 2012
$31,860
Target salary
-3.8%
Change to achieve target
$33,130
Actual salary
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Portugal ranks in the bottom third of the Efficiency Index, lower than all other Mediterranean countries
Our findings suggest that Portugal should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Portugal’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
24th
Efficiency Index
68.29%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
10.46m $25,892 5.62%
Key Country Indicators
PORTUGAL
$ $
10.6
Target pupil/teacher ratio
39.6%
Change to achieve target
7.6
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
488
PISA Reading 2012
489
PISA Science 2012
487
PISA Maths 2012
$30,840
Target salary
-10.8%
Change to achieve target
$34,590
Actual salary
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Slovenia ranks in the Top 10 of the Efficiency Index, yet still lower than its Eastern European neighbours,  
the Czech Republic and Hungary
Our findings suggest that Slovenia should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Slovenia’s education system is a good performer, although it appears to be slightly more efficient than effective
Efficiency Index
83.28%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
2.06m $27,915* 5.69%
Key Country Indicators
7th
SLOVENIA
$ $
9.5
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-32.6%
Change to achieve target
14.1
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
481
PISA Reading 2012
514
PISA Science 2012
501
PISA Maths 2012
$38,210
Target salary
17.6%
Change to achieve target
$32,480
Actual salary
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Spain ranks close to the bottom of the Efficiency Index, with only Switzerland ranking lower  
amongst other Western European countries
Our findings suggest that Spain should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Spain’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
26th
Efficiency Index
63.09%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
46.65m $32,103 4.98%
Key Country Indicators
SPAIN
$ $
17.0
Target pupil/teacher ratio
68.3%
Change to achieve target
10.1
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
488
PISA Reading 2012
496
PISA Science 2012
484
PISA Maths 2012
$32,880
Target salary
-20.8%
Change to achieve target
$41,520
Actual salary
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Sweden ranks in the Top 10 of the Efficiency Index, and above all other Northern European countries, except Finland
Our findings suggest that Sweden should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Sweden’s education system appears to be more efficient than effective. It may be underspending or underperforming
Efficiency Index
80.58%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
9.59m $43,455 6.98%
Key Country Indicators
9th
SWEDEN
$ $
9.6
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-33.1%
Change to achieve target
14.4
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
483
PISA Reading 2012
485
PISA Science 2012
478
PISA Maths 2012
$37,560
Target salary
18.8%
Change to achieve target
$31,610
Actual salary
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Switzerland ranks extremely low on the Efficiency Index, lowest among all European countries
Our findings suggest that Switzerland should consider addressing class sizes to target education efficiency
Switzerland’s education system appears to be more effective than efficient. It may be bloated or overspending
28th
Efficiency Index
59.71%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
8.08m $53,705 5.24%
Key Country Indicators
SWITZERLAND
$ $
22.3
Target pupil/teacher ratio
92.1%
Change to achieve target
11.6
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
509
PISA Reading 2012
515
PISA Science 2012
531
PISA Maths 2012
$35,470
Target salary
-48.5%
Change to achieve target
$68,820
Actual salary
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Turkey ranks fairly low on the Efficiency Index, yet still higher than the other Southern European countries
Our findings suggest that Turkey should consider addressing teacher salaries to target education efficiency
Turkey’s education system is both inefficient and ineffective. Higher efficiency correlates with higher educational outcomes
Efficiency Index
71.44%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
74.93m $18,975 2.86%* 
Key Country Indicators
21st
TURKEY
$ $
1.4
Target pupil/teacher ratio
-91.6%
Change to achieve target
16.4
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
475
PISA Reading 2012
463
PISA Science 2012
448
PISA Maths 2012
$39,380
Target salary
129.2%
Change to achieve target
$17,180
Actual salary
TEACHER SALARIES PISA SCORESPUPIL/TEACHER RATIO
* 2006
The Efficiency Index
Country profiles
62
The UK ranks just outside the Top 10 on the Efficiency Index, but the highest among other Western European countries
Our findings suggest that United Kingdom should consider addressing both class sizes and teacher salaries  
to target education efficiency
The United Kingdom’s education system appears to be more efficient than effective. It may be underspending or underperforming
11th
Efficiency Index
78.71%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
64.10m $36,209 6.23%
Key Country Indicators
UNITED KINGDOM
$ $
16.6
Target pupil/teacher ratio
23.8%
Change to achieve target
13.4
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
499
PISA Reading 2012
514
PISA Science 2012
494
PISA Maths 2012
$36,920
Target salary
-9.8%
Change to achieve target
$40,910
Actual salary
TEACHER SALARIES PISA SCORESPUPIL/TEACHER RATIO
Country profiles
The Efficiency Index 63
The United States ranks in the lower half of the Efficiency Index, just above Chile
Our findings suggest that United States should consider addressing both class sizes and teacher salaries to target education efficiency
The United States’s education system appears to be more efficient than effective. It may be underspending or underperforming
Efficiency Index
72.66%
Population GDP per capita (PPP) Public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP
316.13m $53,143 5.42%
Key Country Indicators
19th
UNITED STATES
$ $
16.8
Target pupil/teacher ratio
10.1%
Change to achieve target
15.3
Actual pupil/teacher ratio
498
PISA Reading 2012
497
PISA Science 2012
481
PISA Maths 2012
$39,520
Target salary
-4.7%
Change to achieve target
$41,460
Actual salary
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Annex A
Strategies Combined
While we have already looked at the specific changes individual 
countries would have to make to improve efficiency, in this section 
we examine the average behaviour of all countries, to gain some 
insight into how drastic a variation in key inputs would have to be 
in order to drive up PISA scores.
We find that on average across all countries in our study, a 2%  
rise in PISA scores could be achieved by:
• Increasing teacher wages by 6% and not changing class size, or
• Lowering class size by 5 pupils (and not changing the teacher wage).
Likewise, our econometric model predicts that to achieve a 5%  
rise in PISA scores it would take:
• A 14% rise in teacher wages (holding class size constant), or
• A reduction by 13 pupils in average class size (holding teacher 
wages constant)
The graph below (Figure A1) maps out all such combinations of 
teacher wage rises and class size variations that would ensure a 
2% or 5% rise in PISA scores. The example point highlighted on 
the graph shows that on average, a 5% increase in PISA scores 
could be achieved by a combination of increasing teachers’ salaries 
by 6% and decreasing the number of pupils per teacher by 8.
The reader should be warned at this juncture that this diagram is 
slightly unusual and needs to be read with care. Those familiar with 
production function isoquants will observe that such trade-offs in 
inputs are usually non-linear and parabolic in shape. Unfortunately 
our data is not rich enough to identify such non-linearities and 
hence we have less confidence in the trade-offs at the extremes – i.e. 
especially in the case of the numerical examples given above. We 
would accordingly have more confidence in the trade-off we have 
graphically displayed in the middle area when the linear function 
estimated is a closer approximation to the non-linear reality.
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Figure A1. 
Different mix of changes 
in teachers’ wages and 
pupil per teacher ratio 
to increase countries’ 
average scores 2% and 
5%, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 2
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Annex B
Other Factors Influencing Efficiency: Tutoring
One factor which is routinely ignored in an explanation of cross 
country education system differences is the extent to which the 
pupils of a country are tutored outside the regular state education 
system – either at Saturday school or private tutors at evenings or 
weekends. We asked respondents about this in our Global Teacher 
Status survey. The proportion varies considerably from 76% in 
Greece to as low as 15% in the Netherlands. (The full table of this 
proportion is included in Table D2.) We are naturally interested in 
understanding the extent to which extra tutoring can contribute  
to the performance of secondary education pupils.  
Figure B1 below shows the correlation between these two 
variables for the 17 countries for which we have information on 
both variables. This figure suggests that extra tuition does not 
explain the variations in PISA scores. Despite this, there is at least 
some degree of correlation between pupils’ performance and the 
efficiency of the educational systems. We proceed to establish 
the potential association between the Efficiency Index and the 
percentage of population receiving extra tutoring (Figure B2). Our 
results suggest that receiving extra tutoring does not contribute to 
higher rankings in terms of educational performance.
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Figure B1. Correlation between PISA scores and Tutoring Received
Figure B2. Correlation between Efficiency and Tutoring Received
Source: Table D2
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Annex C
Time Invariance of Efficiency
Having developed the efficiency scores, it should be asked 
whether this score or its relative ranking across countries has 
changed materially over time. As an alternative, in Table C1 
we take into account the variability over time of both inputs 
and output by estimating a panel model. As a result we can 
present a relative efficiency index for each country by year 
(the last column shows an average efficiency index across 
the time span of our estimates). The conclusion we draw 
from these scores is that there is stability of the relative index 
over the period. This can be taken as a demonstration of the 
consistency of the results to the extent that the classification 
of countries in terms of educational efficiency is very similar.
We have used upper secondary education data to 
estimate the efficiency index reported in Table C1. 
Nevertheless, when the estimates refer to lower secondary 
education the classification obtained is very similar.
We have selected some countries (highlighted in blue) whose 
efficiency index profile is plotted on Figure C1. This figure shows 
the distance in terms of efficiency for a set of developed countries.
Alternatively, Table C2 reports the results obtained by estimating 
a panel data model where we assume the time-invariant 
nature of the inefficiency term (Battese and Coelli, 1988). 
Again, the ranking of countries as measured by the efficiency 
index does not change substantially from what is shown above. 
Nevertheless, the relative distance among the countries widens.
One potential problem with this analysis is that the time-
invariant nature of the inefficiency term can be called into 
question, particularly in the case of empirical applications 
based on long-panel data sets as at present analyses.
To overcome this, several alternative approaches have 
been suggested in the literature to date. In Figure C3 we 
plot the efficiency scores obtained from applying a “true 
random effects model”, which, in the context of panel 
estimates, allows disentangling time-varying inefficiency from 
country-specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
Again, the comparison of the rankings reported in Table 
C2 with those shown in previous tables provide further 
evidence on the consistency of our estimates.
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Figure C1. Efficiency scores trend graphed.
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Table C1. Efficiency scores by country and year (countries ranked from lowest to highest score)
Base case: Year 2000.
Dependent variable: Average of math, science and reading scores by year (PISA).
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Source: 
Authors’ own  
calculations 
(see Table 2).
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Table C2.  
Efficiency scores by country; panel time-invariant  
fixed-effects model
Note: Only countries with more than 1 time occasion are 
considered; thus Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay, Malaysia,  
Tunisia were removed from the estimates.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Figure C2.
Efficiency Rank; panel time-invariant 
fixed-effects model
Source: Authors’ own calculations (see Table C1).
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Figure C3.
Efficiency Ranking; Panel True 
random-effects model (exponential)
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
The results we got using Data 
Envelopment Analyses instead of 
Stochastic Frontier Analyses confirm the 
previous results in terms of countries’ 
efficiency ranking, thus we do not present 
them for the sake of brevity.
Table D2.
Efficiency scores (%) by country  
(from lowest to highest) 
Note 1: For those answering ‘yes’ to the question on whether 
they received extra tutoring we asked the type of tutoring they 
received. Consequently those columns report the % receiving 
each type of tutoring (the question allowed for multiresponse). 
Note 2: Proportion of respondents answering that the type  
of school that did last attend was private or denominational  
or religious school (%).
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Annex D
Data Tables
Table D1.
Stochastic Frontier estimates  
-PISA scores- (cross section  
analysis: exponential distribution)
Notes: 
List of countries included in the estimates:  
See Table 1.
* significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
Base case: Year 2000.
Dependent variable: Mean of math, science  
and reading scores by year (PISA).
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Pupil/Teacher ratio
Teachers' salaries after 15 years in 1000$ 
GDP growth (%)
 2003
 2006
 2009
 2010
Constant
Observations
 lnsig2v
 lnsig2u
 λ
-0.035*** (0.013)
0.031*** (0.004)
0.004 (0.023)
-0.157 (0.171)
-0.045 (0.170)
-0.260 (0.278)
-0.070 (0.185)
0.030 (0.286)
129
0.459*** (0.058)
0.312*** (0.099)
0.678*** (0.146)
Dependent variable: 
Mean standardised scores
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Table D3. List of variables under scrutiny 
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Age
Gender
FT Experience
PT Experience
License
Highest Level of Qualification
Main Area of Study
Specialization
Teacher Interaction: Discussion
Teacher Interaction: Materials
Teacher Interaction: Visits
Teacher Interaction: Observation
Safe neighbourhood
Feel Safe
Security
School Buildings
Overcrowded Classrooms
Teacher workspace
Materials
Job Satisfaction
Curricular goals
Implementing curriculum
Expectations of pupils
Parental Support for achievement
Parental Involvement
Regard for School Property
Pupils desire
Class size Maths & Science
Grade size Maths & Science
Maths: Sci teaching per week mins
% reviewing homework
% listening
% working problems
% working probs on own
% listening re-teach
% Tests quizzes
Assign homework
How often homework
Minutes homework
Pupil ability differences
Pupil background
Special needs
Uninterested pupils
Disruptive pupils
Professional development: content
Pedagogy
Curriculum
Technology
Critical thinking 
Assessment
New set of specific information on teachers and educational environment (from TIMSS):
Starting teachers' wages 
Teachers' wages after 15 years of experience
Teachers' wages at the top 
Net teaching time 
Expenditure 
Student/Teacher
Growth population 
Proportion of Women among staff 
GDP per capita 
GDP growth (%) 
PISA Maths-2000
PISA Reading-2000
PISA Science-2000
PISA Maths-2003
PISA Reading-2003
PISA Science-2003
PISA Maths-2006
PISA Reading-2006
PISA Science-2006
PISA Maths-2009
PISA Reading-2009
PISA Science-2009
PISA Maths-2012
PISA Reading-2012
PISA Science-2012
PIRLS Reading-2001
PIRLS Reading-2006
PIRLS Reading-2011
Math 8th grade TIMMS-1999
Science 8th TIMMS -1999
Math 8th grade TIMMS-2003
Science 8th TIMMS -2003
Math 4th grade TIMMS-2003
Science 4th grade TIMMS-2003
Math 8th grade TIMMS-2007
Science 8th TIMMS -2007
Math 4th grade TIMMS-2007
Science 4th grade TIMMS-2007
Math 8th grade TIMMS-2011
Science 8th TIMMS -2011
Math 4th grade TIMMS-2011
Science 4th grade TIMMS-2011
Variables from OECD and IMF:
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Cornwell et al. (1990) dealt with the problem by proposing the 
following SF model with individual-specific slope parameters:
where the model parameters are estimated extending 
the conventional fixed and random-effects panel data 
estimators. This quadratic specification allows a unit-
specific temporal pattern of inefficiency, although a 
large number of parameters are required (Nx3).
Lee and Schmidt (1993) proposed an alternative 
specification in which uit are specified as:
Where g(t) is a set of time dummy variables. This specification is 
more parsimonious than Cornwell et al. (1990) and it does not 
impose any parametric specification, although it is less flexible, 
because it makes the temporal pattern of uit to be the same 
for all productive units. Greene (2005a) defined a time-varying 
SF Normal-Half Normal model with unit-specific intercepts:
This specification allows distinguishing time-varying inefficiency 
from unit specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
Because of that, Greene named these models as “true” fixed 
(TFE) or random-effects (TRE), according to the assumptions on 
the unobserved unit-specific heterogeneity. Estimation of the 
true random-effects specification can be performed by using 
techniques based on simulation. The Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation of the true fixed-effects variant requires the solution 
of two problems related to the estimation of nonlinear panel 
data models: The first issue is a computational problem due 
to the large dimension of the parameters space. Maximum 
Likelihood Dummy Variable (MLDV) approach is correct even in 
the presence of a large number of not favourable parameters αi 
(N>1000). The second problem, incidental parameters problem, 
is an inferential issue due to the fact that the number of units 
is relatively large compared to the length of the panel. The αis 
are inconsistently estimated as N→∞ with fixed T, since only Ti 
observations are used to estimate each unit specific parameter 
(Neyman and Scott 1948; Lancaster 2002). Belotti and Ilardi 
(2012) showed that this inconsistency affects mostly the variance 
parameters, which are the main elements in the postestimation 
of inefficiencies. The MLDV approach seems to be correct 
only when the length of the panel is large enough (T≥10).
3
4
5
yit = α + x´itβ ± uiti = 1, … , Nt = 4, … , T  
 
uit = wi + wi1t + wi2 t2
uit = g(t)t.ui
yit = αi + x´itβ + εit
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We model the educational system as a company which attempts 
to obtain an output by the transformation of a set of inputs14.  
If we define yi as the maximum potential performance which,  
on average, pupils can obtain for any given combination of inputs, 
in any country I, then equation (1) represents an educational 
frontier production model. This representation requires some 
assumption concerning the disturbance term. The two hypotheses 
which appear to satisfy the greatest level of acceptability lead 
us to differentiate between the deterministic frontier model 
and the stochastic frontier model. The stochastic frontier (SF) 
production function, as outlined by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977), Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) and Battesse and 
Corra (1977) rely on the premise that the deviations from the 
production function are due to statistical noise. Such a stochastic 
factor cannot be attributed to the process of production, and 
hence should not be embedded in a single error term. Hence we 
require two stochastic terms as expressed in equation (1)15,
where vi is usually assumed to be a normally random variable 
(distributed independently of ui) with mean zero and variance 
σ2v, and ui a non-negative error typically assumed to be a 
half-normal distributed variable13, with σ2u > 0. Furthermore, we 
assume both components of the compound disturbance to be 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across observations. 
The independence assumption between ui and vi is essential 
in order to obtain the derivation of the likelihood function. The 
marginalization of ui gives closed-form expressions only for the 
Normal Half-Normal, Normal-Exponential and Normal-Truncated 
Normal models, but in other cases, like in the Normal-Gamma 
model, numerical or simulation-based techniques are required.
In this model λ = σ2u / σ2v, which is a measure of the 
degree of asymmetry of the (vi - ui) disturbance term. The 
larger is λ the more pronounced will be the asymmetry, and 
correspondingly the OLS estimation is less justified. When 
we estimate equation (1) we obtain efficiency scores which 
can be used as a measured of the relative efficiency for the 
countries in our analysis, showing the ‘best’ combination 
of inputs to maximize average pupil performance.
In this research we now have panel data across countries, i, 
in years t. The richer information from panel data helps us to 
relax some of the assumptions in the previous model and to 
consider a more realistic definition of the inefficiencies. Pitt 
and Lee (1981) were the precursor in extending this model 
to panel data. They proposed the Maximum Likelihood 
estimation of the following Normal-Half Normal SF model:
Battese and Coelli (1988) generalized this model to the Normal-
Truncated Normal. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) highlighted that 
the estimation of a SF model with time-invariant inefficiency 
can also be performed by adapting conventional fixed-effects 
estimation techniques, by allowing inefficiency to be correlated 
with the frontier regressors and avoiding distributional 
assumptions about ui. However, as we highlighted in the main 
body of the text, the time-invariant nature of the inefficiency 
term has been put into question, especially when empirical 
applications based on long panel data sets are present. 
14 There are alternative econometric models to analyse cross country variation in countrywide educational performance –see for example Dolton and Marcenaro (2011).
15 As a result this model can be regarded as a generalisation of the standard regression model, the distinguishing feature of which is the presence of a one sided error (ui).
1
2
yi = α+X’iβ+vi-ui
i = 1, ..., n
ui ≥ 0
yit = α + x’iβ + εit i = 2, … , Nt = 2, … , Ti  
 
 
εit = vi - ui
vit ~ N(0, σ2v)
uit ~ N+ (0, σ2u) Half-Normal
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